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There has been much discussion recently on the ‘great Indian land grab’, i.e., 
the acquisition of fertile land by the government, and the handing over of this to 
large-scale industry. What do these ongoing land transfers tell us about the nature of 
the Indian state? To engage with prevalent views about state withdrawal from the 
economic sphere, or its reconstitution as a regulatory entity, this paper builds a 
picture of the state in a liberalising landscape based on empirical evidence. It outlines 
the role of the state in Gujarat province, during a transfer of 30 square kilometres of 
forest and coastal land to a cement manufacturing and exporting operation 
‘Karkhana Ltd’.  
The case of land liberalisation illustrated by the experience of Karkhana does 
not evince a state in withdrawal. Nor do we witness a regulatory state that watches a 
changing economy from the legal and coercive sidelines. As the normative legitimator 
of liberalisation, a buffer in the contentious politics of land, and as an institutional 
promoter of and manoeuvrer through the new land regime, India’s state is central to 




















                                                 
1 Nikita Sud is Departmental Lecturer in Development Studies at the University of Oxford. This paper 
was presented in the panel ‘The changing nature of the Indian state’ at the conference of the British 
Association of South Asian Studies in Cambridge, March 2007. 
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There has been much discussion recently on the ‘great Indian land grab’. The 
term denotes the on-going acquisition of fertile land by the state
2, and the handing 
over of this to industry, the promoters of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other 
such players of India’s new, liberalising economy. Transfers of land, it appears, are 
even being carried out at rock bottom prices
3. They become especially significant 
given that less than half a century ago, the state that is supportive of them was 
associated with slogans like ‘land to the tiller’
4. 
The ‘land to the tiller’ reforms under which the redistribution of land from 
large landowners to actual tillers was proposed by India’s newly independent state, 
were only a partial success. Yet, in Kutch district of Gujarat province where this paper 
is empirically based for instance, by 1958 7714 square kilometres of land owned by 
the former ruling principalities had been requisitioned under the Bombay (Kutch 
Inams) Abolition Act, and distributed amongst 61,902 people
5. 
Having redistributed land, an interventionist state had then imposed 
restrictions on the uses to which it could be put. For instance in Gujarat, redistributed 
or ‘new tenure’ land could not be sold without the state’s permission. If sale was 
allowed, it would be limited to agriculturists living within an eight kilometre radius. 
Similar authorisation was required to convert agricultural land to a non-agricultural 
purpose
6. The state’s idea behind these measures, of course, was to retain agricultural 
land within the rural, primarily agrarian economy, and prevent it from leaving the 
possession of ‘sons of the soil’.      
Moving forward, under the larger regime of liberalisation, from 1989-90 
Gujarat’s state had put in place various measures that reversed its earlier interventions 
in the land economy. For instance in 1995, the restrictions on purchasing land within 
eight kilometres of the buyer’s residence were lifted. In the same year, the conversion 
of agricultural land up to ten hectares for a non-agricultural purpose, without any 
authorisation from the state, was permitted
7. To reinforce the direction in which these 
changes were heading, the state declared in 2005 that it intended to open up 16,006 
square kilometres of land for large-scale corporate farming and for industry
8. Quite 
clearly, the great Indian land grab and the re-agglomeration of land in the hands of the 
                                                 
2 In this paper, the wider concept of ‘the state’ has been consciously used in most places, as opposed to 
‘government’. The latter refers to the institutional aspects of the state, including the bureaucracy, 
political executive and police machinery. The former includes ideas and norms like ‘land to the tiller’, 
as well as institutions of governance. See Abrams, P. (1988) ‘Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the 
State’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 1(1), March. Pgs. 58-89 
3 Bidwai, P. (2006) ‘The great land grab’, Frontline, September 9-22; Ramdas, L. and Ramdas, L. 
(2007) ‘Land Grab in Raigad’, Letters, Economic and Political Weekly, January 13; Pgs. 78, 172; Sen, 
A.K. (2006) ‘Land Struggle in Singur’, Letters, Economic and Political Weekly, September 23, Pgs. 
3994, 4088; Thakurta, P.G. (2006) ‘Economic zone plans polarise India’, BBC News / South Asia, 2 
October  
4 Herring, R.J. (1983) Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in South Asia. 
New Haven: Yale University Press 
5 Government of Gujarat (1976) The Land Reforms Laws in Gujarat. Gandhinagar: Government 
Central Press, Pg. 20 
6 Government of Gujarat (1988) The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (As modified 
up to 31
st December 1988), Legal Department, Gandhinagar: Government of Gujarat  
7 Times of India ‘Curbs on conversion of farmland lifted. State to amend land revenue Act’, Times of 
India, Ahmedabad Edition, 2/12/95; Indian Express ‘Land Acts to be amended to favour industry’, 
Indian Express, Ahmedabad Edition, 4/1/96 
8 Times of India, ‘Protest against GR on giving wasteland to industries’, Times of India, Ahmedabad 
Edition, 10/8/05  
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mega players of the new economy needs to be seen within a contextual shift from 
ideas and policies of ‘land to the tiller’ to those of ‘land liberalisation’
9.  
 
What does the apparent shift in emphasis from ‘land to the tiller’ to land 
liberalisation tell us about the nature of the Indian state? Is this a state that is actively 
transferring productive resources to corporate farmers and large-scale industry as it 
prepares to unequivocally withdraw from the economic and developmental sphere? 
Alternatively, is this a state that is not necessarily withdrawing from the economy 
under India’s liberalising regime, but is altering its raison d’etre to a more regulatory 
focus
10? Will this regulatory state actively change land laws, and then expend its 
administrative, legal or even coercive energies on ensuring their compliance, albeit 
from the developmental sidelines?  
Pegging the case of land on to the minimalist or regulatory analytical 
frameworks of the contemporary Indian state would be relatively straightforward, 
given that these views are supported by significant sections of the academic and 
policy-making establishment
11. However, there would be a large element of 
speculation in this analytical exercise. One would be assuming that all that the state is 
doing in India today is changing and then regulating land laws, and stepping back 
from any intervention beyond that point. This interpretation would also indicate that 
in the making and monitoring of land policy, the state’s role is linear, mechanical and 
almost a-political. The question to raise at this point is- do these speculative notions 
about India’s state in a liberalising landscape stand up to empirical scrutiny? What, 
indeed, does the story of land tell us about India’s state today? To engage with these 
questions is the task of this paper. 
This paper builds a picture of the Indian state based on empirical evidence. It 
outlines the role of the state in Gujarat during a transfer of 30 square kilometres of 
forest and coastal land to a cement manufacturing and exporting operation ‘Karkhana 
Ltd’
12 in 1993-95. Section I lays out the process of acquisition of land by Karkhana, 
and the official, facilitative role played by the state in this. Section II highlights some 
criticism faced by Karkhana, indicating that the liberalisation of land in India is not 
proceeding unopposed. Section III goes beyond the state’s initial role of sanctioning 
land to Karkhana. It explores its continuing support to the Company through periods 
of protest and litigation, and suggests that Karkhana would not have been able to 
establish operations in Kutch without the active intervention of Gujarat’s state. 
Section IV concludes with a statement on what the Karkhana deal tells us about the 
nature of the state in a liberalising landscape.   
                                                 
9 See also Sud, N. (2007) From Land to the Tiller to Land Liberalisation: The Political Economy of 
Gujarat’s Shifting Land Policy’, Modern Asian Studies, Volume 41, Number 3, May. Pgs. 603-638 
10 Regulation refers to the administrative technology of influencing and monitoring the market, 
including non-state welfare organisations and functions through law-backed specialised ‘regulating’ 
agencies. This technology seeks to replace the method of public ownership or more direct state 
intervention in the economy, which was popular in the developed as well as developing world in the 
mid-twentieth century. The privatisation and unbundling of services formerly provided by the state, 
with the latter taking on the role of facilitator and regulator, has gained momentum in the developing 
world from the mid-1980s. See Moran, M. (2002) ‘Review Article: Understanding the Regulatory 
State’, British Journal of Political Science, 32. Pgs. 391-413 
11 For an influential regulatory conceptualisation of the state see World Bank (1997) World 
Development Report: The State in a Changing World. New York: Oxford University Press. For a 
minimalist view see Lal, D. (1983) The Poverty of ‘Development Economics’, Paperback 16, 1
st 
Edition. London: Hobart 
12 Pseudonym 
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Data for the paper was collected during fieldwork in Gujarat from June 2004 
to January 2005. This fieldwork was conducted for a DPhil in Development Studies at 
the University of Oxford. Sources for the paper include official policy documents, 
formal notes and communications of the departments that were associated with the 
Karkhana case, viz. Industry, Revenue and Forest, legal documents and affidavits 
filed by the Government of Gujarat (GoG), Government of India (GoI), Karkhana 
Ltd. and various NGOs when the land acquisition got embroiled in controversy, 
interviews with activists and lawyers familiar with the case, and reports filed by the 
Gujarati as well as national media.   
 
A company looks for land in liberalising Gujarat: setting out the Karkhana case 
Karkhana had no experience of manufacturing cement when it came looking 
to set up a mega cement plant in Kutch. When established in 1985 in a South Indian 
province, the Company produced leather and PVC plastic products. In 1991-92 
however, it started viewing Kutch as a potential base for its new venture. This remote 
district of Gujarat is rich in sand and minerals like limestone that are used in cement 
manufacture, and importantly, the state was keen to encourage private enterprise in 
the sector.  
Of course, well beyond the cement industry, Gujarat’s state has generally 
embraced the economic reforms initiated nationally in 1991. Its reputation is that of 
leading one of the most rapidly liberalising provinces in India
13. The state has actively 
promoted slogans like ‘Gujarat Going Global’ and ‘Vibrant Gujarat’, with a view to 
attracting investors and making Gujarat India’s ‘Number One’ province in the 
economic development stakes
14. Quite understandably, its reception of Karkhana Ltd. 
was enthusiastic. 
In 1993, the then Janata Party-Congress coalition government had welcomed 
the company’s proposal to set up a mega- 2.6 million tonnes a year- cement 
manufacturing and export facility in coastal Kutch with an investment of Rupees 7 
billion. To make its project viable, the Company wanted to purchase around 8 square 
kilometres of land for setting up a factory, and a further 2.5 square kilometres for 
constructing warehouses, roads and a private jetty from which to transport cement by 
sea to west and south India, West Asia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Singapore and other 
neighbouring countries. Finally, it was looking to lease around 20 square kilometres 
of land from the GoG for mining Kutch’s lignite, limestone and bauxite deposits.  
Karkhana’s mining proposal brought into its ambit the Narayan Sarovar 
Wildlife Sanctuary (NSWS) that had been established in Kutch in 1981. This 
sanctuary, in Lakhpat block encompassed 765.79 kilometres, and housed a variety of 
wild life, local and migratory birds, and flora. The specific purpose of establishing the 
sanctuary had been stated by the GoG as ‘protecting, propagating and developing 
wildlife and environment’
15. This was considered especially important in an arid 
district with barely 2.5 per cent green cover. All these considerations were set aside 
when Karkhana came calling. 
As the Wildlife (Protection) Act under which the NSWS had been established 
did not allow mineral exploitation, the government issued a notice in 1993 declaring 
                                                 
13 Hirway, I. and D. Mahadevia (1999) Gujarat Human Development Report 1999. Ahmedabad: 
Mahatma Gandhi Labour Institute 
14 Government of Gujarat (2003) Gujarat Going Global. Gujarat Industrial Policy 2003. Gandhinagar: 
Industries and Mines Department, Government of Gujarat 
15 Government of Gujarat (1981) Notification, Agriculture, Forest and Co-operation Department, 14 
April. Gandhinagar: Government of Gujarat 
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that it had delimited the sanctuary. From 765.79 square kilometres, it had been 
reduced to a mere 94.87 square kilometres. Following a petition from an NGO, the 
Consumer Education and Research Society (CERS) challenging the delimitation of 
the NSWS, the High Court of Gujarat stepped in to reverse the government’s 
decision. Its rationale was technical, i.e., under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, only the 
legislature had the authority to change boundaries. Since the Janata-Congress 
government had taken an executive decision without consulting the legislature, its 
action was void
16. 
Even as its mining project was stuck in Court, Karkhana had been confident 
enough to lay the foundation stone of its cement plant outside the NSWS area
17. In 
fact, right after the Court verdict which effectively closed its chances of mining for 
limestone locally, the Company had been sold 7.3 square kilometres of land, in 
Abdasa Block by the government. It had also bought 2.5 square kilometres of land 
from the government on the coast in Abdasa, for building its private jetty. The latter 
piece had been sold to it at the ridiculously low price of 500 rupees a hectare
18 (100 
hectares = 1 square kilometre). 
Despite the sale of almost 10 square kilometres of revenue and forest land 
formerly owned by the government to Karkhana, for the project to take off, a mining 
lease was imperative. Thus, the matter of delimiting the NSWS was resurrected as 
soon as the BJP government came to power in March 1995. In July, it took the issue 
to the legislative assembly. On 27 July, with little debate and in the absence of the 
Opposition that had been expelled from the assembly for rowdy behaviour, Gujarat’s 
legislature agreed to the delimitation of the NSWS from 765.79 to 444.23 square 
kilometres.  
In the days following the delimitation of the sanctuary, newspapers reported 
that 20 square kilometres of former NSWS land would be leased to Karkhana. In 
addition, the encouraging stance of the state had prompted applications from 25 
cement manufacturers for setting up plants in Kutch, with a proposed investment of 
Rupees 50 billion
19. These Companies had applied for land sales and mining leases 
amounting to 800 square kilometres in and around the NSWS area
20. Later, an 
industrial plan for the region forecast that it could accommodate 43 large cement 
plants, making Kutch a cement hub
21. This plan said little about where water for the 
water-intensive cement industry would be sourced in this severely water scarce, desert 
region.  
Karkhana, in a sense then, became the leader in the potential opening up of 
Kutch to the cement and infrastructure industry. After clearing the initial hurdle of 
obtaining a mining lease in a former wildlife sanctuary, by 1995 the Company was in 
possession of 30 square kilometres of land in Kutch. This may suggest that with 
                                                 
16 High Court of Gujarat, in Lok Adhikar Sangh (1995) Special Civil Application No. 8799 of 1995, in 
the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. Unpublished Document 
17 Nambiar, P. (1995) ‘Shrinking sanctuary. The consequences of denotification’, Frontline, September 
8-21 
18 Collectorate Kutch (1995) Order No. Land-Pa-Vashi-1301-79, Revenue Branch, Collector’s Office, 
Kutch, Unpublished official order 
The low sale price of this land becomes even more stark when one reckons that Rupees 80,000-100,000 
would be the minimum price of a one-room shanty in some of the poorer slums in Ahmedabad city 
today (Achyut Yagnik, social activist, Ahmedabad, personal communication, August 2006).  
19 Indian Express (1995) ‘Narayan Sarovar sanctuary delimited’, Indian Express, Ahmedabad Edition, 
28/7/1995 
20 Lok Adhikar Sangh (1995) 
21 Nambiar, P. (1995, 73) 
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sufficient support from a proactive state, land liberalisation is proceeding at an even 
pace in Gujarat. However, the fortunes of Karkhana through the mid and late 1990s 
question this assumption.  
After taking possession of its land, the Company continued to face resistance 
and legal action from NGOs, Kutchi peoples’ associations, even government 
departments, through much of the 1990s. Its journey in Gujarat was thus by no means 
smooth. The next section looks at some opposition to the Karkhana enterprise. It 
becomes the context for later examining the actions of the state not only in allowing 
Karkahana’s acquisition of land, but also supporting the Company well after its initial 
facilitating role was over.   
 
Questioning the transfer of land to Karkhana 
The rapid pace at which the landscape of Kutch was being reconfigured 
through land liberalisation in the 1990s attracted a spate of litigation. In the Karkhana 
case, immediately after the delimitation of NSWS in 1995, the NGO CERS filed a suit 
in the High Court of Gujarat. It indicated that even though the area of the NSWS had 
been reduced flouting concerns for wildlife, the former sanctuary area was still 
forested. No commercial activity and felling of trees was possible there, and even 
under absolute compulsion, permission for this activity was required from the national 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). The litigant asked, had the proposed 
cement plant been given this permission? If so, then why had the locals who depended 
on this forested area for a living not been informed about this
22?  
Further, in October 1995, Lok Adhikar Sangh (LAS), an NGO, along with 
three other Kutchi and Gujarati NGOs, filed a petition against Karkhana and the 
Governments of India and Gujarat. They challenged the NSWS delimitation saying it 
went against the Forest Act that mandated the protection of forested areas; it was 
against the Constitutional Right to life, livelihood and a safe environment of the 
20,000 people who lived in 56 villages in the sanctuary area, depending on it for 
animal fodder and forest produce such as herbs and honey. Moreover, the government 
had not consulted or even informed local people about the proposed project, which 
would pollute the air and water of the entire area, and possibly cause an increase in 
salinity with the reduction of tree cover and open cast mining.  
LAS further alleged that while the government had gone to great lengths to 
grant land to Karkhana even though between 1981 and 1994, it had disregarded the 
petitions of thousands of locals for residential, agricultural and pastoral land, to which 
they were entitled. The Company had started construction of its plant with local 
supplies of water and not desalinated water as it was claiming to the media, thus 
causing even more distress to the locals. Finally, the NSWS delimitation violated 
various international conventions to which the GoI is a signatory, including the 
Convention on Biological Diversity signed at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992
23. 
Even as the government’s move to grant land to Karkhana was attracting 
criticism from the media and NGOs, one of its own departments, the Department of 
Forests came out with an internal report in December 1995 indicating that Karkhana 
was encroaching on 107.40 hectares of forest land. The report suggested that the 
Company had started building a private road on this land and had also laid out 
markers indicating that it would start more construction on this land soon. This would 
be illegal since any construction on forest land required permission from the 
                                                 
22 CERS (Consumer Education and Research Society) (1995) Special Civil Application No. 6707 of 
1995, In the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. Unpublished Document 
23 Lok Adhikar Sangh (1995) 
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Department of Forests, GoG. In addition, the proposed jetty of the Company would be 
built deep in the Kharo creek, thus encroaching on the reserved Western Mangrove 
Forest. This too was deemed unlawful under the Indian Forest Act 1927, Forest 
Conservation Act 1980 and Environment Protection Act 1986
24.  
Finally, along the lines of the objection of Gujarat’s Forest Department to the 
allotment of forest land to Karkhana, the national NGO, the World Wide Fund for 
Nature- India (WWFNI) filed a case in the Gujarat High Court in 1996. WWFNI 
challenged the granting of ecologically vulnerable forest areas for a cement plant. It 
opposed the proposed construction of a jetty by the Company since it would be done 
in the protected Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ). India’s CRZ laws forbid 
construction within 500 metres of the high tide level without the permission of the 
MoEF.  
WWFNI’s case was that this permission had not been taken, and it should not 
be given because the CRZ area sought by Karkhana contained endangered mangrove 
forests. Mangroves within the CRZ would be destroyed by the Company for building 
its jetty and for taking a road from the jetty to the plant site. In addition, WWFNI 
asserted that the Court must direct the Central Government to prosecute all those, 
including the provincial government, which had contravened environmental 
regulations to allow construction on forest and CRZ land
25. The Court did indeed step 
in on this point and ordered the Company to stop further construction in the CRZ area 
till it had reached a decision on the WWFNI case.   
The chain of events and contests that arose in the grant of land and setting up 
of Karkhana’s cement plant in Kutch clearly indicate the unsteadiness of the land 
liberalisation process. In some cases, questioning over the grant of land to Karkhana 
came from within departments of the government. In most instances, the state and the 
cement Company were seen by non-state litigants and sections of the media as a 
united party in the attempts to liberalise land rapidly, at a very high cost to the 
environment and local livelihoods.  
The shaping of protest around the Karkhana case indicates that opponents did 
not see the state’s role in the transfer of land as minimal or even legitimate. The state, 
far from being a distant, facilitating party, continued to be drawn into the Karkhana 
case after the initial transfers of land. This was thus not a state in rapid, unequivocal 
withdrawal from the sphere of privatised, liberalised land. The next section shows it 
to have been central not just in the pinning of criticism over the Karkhana issue, but 
also fundamental in the manoeuvring and management of this opposition and 
litigation that Karkhana faced after it had been granted titles to land.  
 
The state in a liberalising landscape 
The role of Gujarat’s state in making possible the entry and continued 
existence of Karkhana in Kutch can be seen at three levels. On the one hand, the state 
generated legitimating ideas that created the context for Karkhana being seen as a 
positive force in the Kutchi economy. Second, government institutions negotiated 
with state as well as non-state actors on behalf of Karkhana through the 1990s. 
Finally, government officials and Gujarat’s political executive actively dissipated the 
political protests and opposition that had been generated by Karkhana’s entry into 
                                                 
24 Conservator of Forests (1995) A Detailed Report on the Unauthorised Encroachments on Reserved 
Forest Lands by the Sanghi Cement Company, Kutch Circle. Unpublished  Document 
25 WWFNI (World Wide Fund for Nature- India) (1996) Special Civil Application No. 2870, In the 
High Court of Gujarat, Unpublished Document 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS155                                                       Page 8                                
         
Kutch. Each of these crucial functions performed by the state in a liberalising 
landscape will now be discussed in turn. 
The introduction to this paper suggested that the early postcolonial state’s 
ideas of land to the tiller, which envisaged parcelling this resource into small family 
units, are no longer considered developmentally feasible. Gujarat’s new mantra is 
rapid economic growth, through the avenues of mass corporate farming and ‘mega’ 
industry
26, the base for which remains land. At the level of formal policy, the notion 
that deregulated land use must form the base for India’s economic liberalisation is 
reflected in the Karkhana case. Thus, the text of the legislative assembly resolution 
that sought to delimit the area of the NSWS to enable mining declared that 
…the rich minerals in this area are very essential for the development of 
Kutch…which is a backward district…. The area is frequented by droughts leading to 
large scale migration of (the) population…unemployment and poverty. Minerals are 
the main resources over there and it is of paramount importance that the mineral based 
industry should be established as key to the future development…a number of cement 
plants can be established with the use of the large deposits of limestone leading to 
economic prosperity of the area. …unless these areas are taken out of the sanctuary 
these projects will run into serious difficulties… and also lead to loss of investment 
already tied up. Government has received several applications for setting up cement 
factories… 
- Text of the Assembly resolution, 1995
27 
The preceding excerpt suggests that ideas of development through economic 
liberalisation, including the liberalisation of land, are not necessarily being projected 
prominently and by themselves at the public level. Instead, in the Karkhana context, 
these ideas were correlated with other powerful, if vague and unsubstantiated ideas 
such as employment generation, migration control, and ‘development’. This 
interweaving of ideas is seen not only in the discourse of the official state as a whole, 
but also at that of individuals within the state. Thus, one comes across the Minister for 
Industries justifying the setting up of the cement plant on the grounds of employment 
generation for the local populace and socio-economic uplift of the entire district
28. 
While it is true that the cement enterprise was normatively supported by 
different state actors, we also know that the ideas of ‘overall development’ and ‘the 
greater common good’ associated with Karkhana were challenged by some 
government officials as well as NGOs and people’s groups. For instance, in 1996 an 
autonomous organisation, the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute 
(NEERI), funded by the Government of India came out with a report on the Karkhana 
project at the behest of the Supreme Court. NEERI contradicted many of the ideas on 
which Gujarat’s government was justifying the cement plant in Kutch. It did not see 
gains in equity and social justice emerging from the project, and it was not convinced 
about the plant and jetty’s positive or even harmless relationship with the region’s 
ecology
29. 
Any criticism of Karkhana’s entry into Kutch and its takeover of a large and 
ecologically sensitive landmass was challenged by the Company as well as the state. 
                                                 
26 Times of India ‘Maldharis demand pastoral zones’, Times of India, Ahmedabad Edition, 23/9/05 
27 Reproduced in Economic Times, ‘Text of Assembly resolution on sanctuary’, Economic Times, 
Bombay Edition, 28/7/95 
28 Minister for Industries, Government of Gujarat, quoted in Times of India, 6/6/95, cited in Lok 
Adhikar Sangh (1995)  
29 NEERI 1996, in Rathi, A.K.A (1997) Indian Council of Enviro-Legal Action versus Union of India 
and Others, Special Civil Application No. 590 of 1997, Affidavit in Reply on behalf of the GoG, 
Unpublished Document 
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For instance, sections of the media and NGO activists pointed out that these parties 
termed those who questioned the gains of the liberalisation agenda in the Karkhana 
case ‘anti-development, anti-national terrorists’
30. The so-called ‘terrorists’ were even 
accused of working with developed countries to keep Gujarat underdeveloped
31.  
The latter, to me, represent a powerful set of ideas. In these, nationalism is 
interwoven with rapid industrialisation on a base of liberalised land, development and 
making ‘sacrifices’ for growth. Indeed, when one looks at the outcome of litigation 
faced by Karkhana in the 1990s, it is evident that these ideas, promoted most vocally 
by the state, prevailed. Thus, overriding various objections to the cement plant, while 
dismissing the LAS petition challenging the denotification of parts of the NSWS, the 
High Court of Gujarat ended with the words ‘it is clear that the people of Kutch 
district will be benefited at large’
32. 
Having surveyed the critical role played by Gujarat’s state in generating 
legitimating ideas like development, mega industrialisation and employment creation 
in order to not just facilitate, but fundamentally make possible the operationalisation 
of Karkhana’s enterprise in Kutch, I now turn to the interventions of the institutional 
government system in this process. 
 
At one level, the story of the GoG’s institutional assistance to the Karkhana 
project is straightforward and may reflect its generally accepted and visible role in a 
liberalising landscape. This government is expected to attract entrepreneurs, make 
available suitable locales and packages of, say, tax incentives, cut red tape, and should 
hurdles in the form of litigation arise, support the private player fully. What this 
aspect of official facilitation does not reveal of course is the extent of manoeuvring 
and contortion that is being undertaken by contemporary governments to promote the 
liberalisation process and its principal private actors.  
That manoeuvring will be required in a liberalising landscape is almost 
obvious. The government system is faced with a situation of having to tackle and 
sometimes undo institutional rules and practices created by it in an earlier 
developmental, interventionist role. These rules and practices have not disappeared 
with the mere declaration of policies and ideas of liberalisation. Instead, they are 
having to be negotiated. The following paragraphs highlight the role of Gujarat’s 
government system as it manoeuvres through its own regulations and committees, 
described by some officials as ‘hurdles’, on behalf of Karkhana
33. They show 
departments of the government (a) facilitating the entry of Karkhana by changing and 
overlooking procedures, (b) acting as brokers on behalf of Karkhana before various 
government bodies and law courts, and (c) deliberately obfuscating procedures and 
rules in the transfer of land to Karkhana. 
We have seen that the NSWS was formed in 1981 for the protection of 
wildlife. An attempt was made by the government executive to reduce the boundaries 
of the sanctuary by order in 1993 and open up the delimited area for mining for the 
production of cement. When this was challenged in Court, a successful change was 
made to the boundary of the sanctuary using the mandate of the legislative assembly. 
Here, on the advice of the Department of Industry, the Department of Mines and the 
Chief Minister’s Office, the government system had been able to overturn a step 
                                                 
30 Indian Express ‘Narayan Sarovar sanctuary delimited’, Indian Express, Ahmedabad Edition, 28/7/95 
31 Nambiar, P. (1995, 72-75) 
32 High Court of Gujarat (1995) Decision regarding Special Civil Application Nos. 6507 and 6707 of 
1995, given on 11/10/1995. Unpublished Document 
33 Rathi, A.K.A (1997) 
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towards environmental conservation it had taken some decades ago. In the 
overturning of this order, the government had not thought it fit to consult the Wildlife 
Advisory Board that its Department of Forests had constituted in 1994 under the 
Wildlife Protection Act 1972. Its mandate was to advise the government, especially in 
matters such as the changing of land use of sanctuaries
34.  
The preceding is a case of facilitation of Karkhana’s entry into Kutch by 
legally easing rules and ignoring the opinion of advisory bodies that it is not 
mandatory to consult. In other instances, one sees particular departments of the 
government not just easing rules, but actually negotiating with and confronting other 
provincial government departments, the national government and environmental 
activists in an act of brokerage for Karkhana. The manoeuvring around the 
environmental compulsions posed by the Coastal Regulation Zone of Kutch illustrates 
this point. 
In February 1995, on being informed about the proposed cement plant of 
Karkhana, the national MoEF had insisted that the Company seek a full 
environmental clearance. Then, on being requested by the Company, the GoG made a 
representation to the MoEF that it should consider encouraging this ‘export-oriented’ 
operation. On the recommendation of the GoG, the MoEF sent a letter to Karkhana in 
June 1995 waiving certain environment-related regulations, but emphasising the need 
for compliance with others.  
The Ministry had indicated that exemption of certain environmental clearances 
granted to Karkhana was on the condition that (a) no mining would be undertaken 
within 25 kilometres of the sanctuary, (b) the Company should submit an 
environmental management plan to the Ministry before starting production, (c) state 
of the art technology would be used to keep land, air and water pollution under 
control, (d) liquid effluents would be treated according to the stipulated standards of 
the Gujarat Pollution Control Board. Reversing its earlier order of a full 
environmental clearance, the MoEF had then added that since the cost of the 
Company’s captive jetty facility was less than 0.5 billion rupees, it would not need to 
obtain this clearance from the Ministry. However, it would still need to take 
permission from the Ministry for the jetty which was proposed to be located within 
500 metres of the CRZ
35. 
On getting this letter, Karkhana asked the GoG to intervene again. The 
Company found the restriction on mining within 25 kilometres from the sanctuary 
‘not acceptable’ since the mining site granted by the GoG was within five kilometres 
of the new sanctuary limit
36. Taking this concern into account, the GoG wrote to the 
MoEF once again, indicating that  
…keeping in view that the entire local populace, successive state governments, 
scientific research reports, all indicate the project has positive impacts, and looking 
into the above facts we request you to kindly amend your letter dated 16
th June 1995 
to revoke the conditions of mining of limestone 25 kms away from the sanctuary…  
-  Government of Gujarat
37 
With the brokerage of GoG, Karkhana was able to get several environmental checks 
and balances waived, including the restriction of not mining near the sanctuary. 
                                                 
34 Lok Adhikar Sangh (1995, 34) 
35 MoEF (Ministry of Environment and Forests) (1995) ‘Subject: Export Oriented 2.6 MTPA Cement 
Plant and Captive Jetty facilities at Kachchh- Exemption from Environmental Clearance’ Office 
Memorandum, No. J- 11012/105/94-1A (1), 16/6/1995, Unpublished document  
36 In High Court of Gujarat (1995) 
37 Ibid 
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However, the Company or the GoG were unable to convince the MoEF about 
overlooking CRZ restrictions for the setting up of the Company’s jetty.  
The MoEF had issued a notification in 1991 under the Environmental 
(Protection) Act 1986, which declared stretches of the Indian coast as CRZ. These 
were zones in seas, bays, estuaries, creeks, rivers and backwaters which are 
influenced by tidal action up to 500 metres from the High Tide Line. The MoEF had 
set out some activities that would be prohibited within a CRZ, including in the area 
between the High Tide and Low Tide line. The construction of a jetty was prohibited 
under CRZ rules, other than in exceptional circumstances. To determine the latter, 
environmental clearance from the MoEF was mandatory. The Ministry’s stance on the 
CRZ issue was strengthened when in 1996 WWFNI filed a case against Karkhana, 
GoG and MoEF asking how a jetty had been proposed in a region that came under 
CRZ rules
38. 
GoG found itself at an impasse on the CRZ issue. Karkhana’s project would 
not be viable without a captive jetty, and according to CRZ restrictions, this jetty 
could not be built because it fell within the regulated zone. Having attempted, and 
succeeded in brokering other environmental clearances for Karkhana, on getting stuck 
on the CRZ, GoG combined brokerage with other methods of manoeuvre. It actually 
went through a knowledge-altering exercise wherein, through a different system of 
classification, it was able to prove before the MoEF and the High Court that CRZ 500 
metre restrictions did not apply to the coast on which Karkhana’s jetty was to be 
located! All this after it had first agreed that the jetty would fall within the CRZ and 
had thus asked the MoEF to waive this restriction for Karkhana.  
Confronted with litigation from the WWFNI and the insistence of the MoEF, 
the GoG proposed that the land it had sold to the Company for building its jetty 
bordered a creek and not the open sea. According to the Coastal Zone Management 
Plan proposed by the GoG and approved by the MoEF in September 1996, the CRZ 
500 metre limit did not apply to creeks. The building limit for creeks was 100 metres 
from the High Tide line, beyond which Karkhana could be allowed to build its jetty. 
The MoEF and the High Court were compelled to accept this line of argument and 
allowed construction of the jetty, which stands in the Kharo creek today
39. 
That the process of brokerage and manoeuvre undertaken by the GoG was not 
unique to the Karkhana case is made clear by the fact that one of its departments, the 
Gujarat Maritime Board (GMB) lists processes of manoeuvre around environmental 
laws as an official activity on its website. That is, under the ‘activities’ section of its 
environment cell, the GMB includes ‘obtaining environmental clearances under the 
CRZ notification for port projects’
40. 
Having looked at two forms of manoeuvre- the simplification/alteration of 
laws, and brokerage- being undertaken by departments of Gujarat’s government 
system on behalf of private enterprises while liberalising Gujarat’s landscape, I turn to 
the last form of manoeuvre visible in the Karkhana case. The following paragraphs 
discuss the government’s deliberate blurring of laws and procedures in order to push 
through decisions. Two illustrations are provided here. The first looks at the tone of a 
letter written by the Collector of Kutch while awarding land to Karkhana, and the 
                                                 
38 WWFNI (1996)  
39 High Court of Gujarat (1997) Order regarding Special Civil Application No. 1750 of 1997, in 
Special Civil Application No. 10605 of 1995, with Special Civil Application No. 1743 of 1997, in 
Special Civil Application No. 2870 of 1996, with Special Civil Application No. 3609 of 1997, in 
Special Civil Application No. 10605 of 1995, given on 19/6/1997. Unpublished Document 
40 GMB, ‘Activities of the Environment Cell’, www.gmbports.org/env_act.htm, accessed 7/7/06 
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second discusses the government’s encouragement of piece-by-piece development of 
the Karkhana project, in order to keep its scale under the level of clearances required 
for large-scale initiatives.  
In June 1995, the then Collector of Kutch wrote to Karkhana sanctioning the 
250 acres of coastal land they had requested to build a jetty and roads to connect this 
with their cement plant. The Collector’s letter said that  
…the Company would…need an NOC (no objection certificate) from the Gujarat 
Maritime Board before getting possession of land. The land would be given a metre 
away from the high tide level….in addition to…these conditions, any other terms and 
conditions of the government would be binding on the Company if these came up…  
- Collectorate Kutch 1995
41 
While the Collector’s letter mentioned some conditions for sanctioning the coastal 
land, it did not make the 500 metre CRZ rule explicit. The other terms and conditions 
for starting construction were also kept vague, yet open ended. This suggests that 
even as the government system has simplified rules and brokered deals to liberalise 
the landscape, it has also had to ride the institutional momentum of the interventionist 
state, and comply with its normative and legal compulsions to follow older sets of 
rules. The latter however, have been kept deliberately indistinct, even ‘blurred’.  
One can call the lack of clarity in the Collector’s letter above, either a case of 
inefficiency, implying omission, or of oversight, implying commission, in the need to 
mention CRZ rules to the Company. This may put the onus for the way things turned 
out, on to an individual official, i.e., the Collector. However, this would be too 
convenient an explanation. A far more plausible one would lie in the Collector’s 
compulsion to observe, and be seen as observing, all applicable governmental rules in 
his letter to Karkhana. He would have to go through this process not merely as an 
individual officer, but also on behalf of a government that is making the transition 
from developmental interventionism to liberalisation. Of course, in this particular 
case, the Collector merely alluded to rules that applied to Karkhana. He did not spell 
them out. Nor did the Company have any compulsion to find them out. The Karkhana 
jetty was sought to be built in this deliberately blurred space.  
The second example of the deliberate lack of clarity in the land liberalisation 
process comes from the piece-by-piece manner in which various land deals and 
related environmental clearances have been obtained in the Karkhana case. On facing 
litigation from WWFNI, the national MoEF had appointed a committee of experts to 
ascertain whether the Company’s proposed jetty would be violating CRZ laws and 
harming the coastal environment. The committee’s report indicated that the Company 
had sought separate clearances for its captive limestone mines, cement manufacturing 
plants, captive jetty and power plant from the Gujarat Pollution Control Board and the 
national MoEF, spread over the period 1992-1996.  
…The appraising agencies instead of treating these individual activities separately, 
should have insisted on a single project appraisal in order to assess total 
environmental impact of the entire project. The Committee was not able to get a 
picture of the total environmental impact of the project on the coastal ecosystem… 
- Agarwal et al
42 
                                                 
41 Collectorate Kachchh (1995)  
42 Agarwal, A., C.J. Saldanha, P. Pande, B.C. Chaudhry, Nominee of the National Institute of 
Oceonography, Nominee of the Survey of India and S.K. Aggarwal (1997) Report of the Committee 
appointed by the Ministry of Environment and Forests to assess the Captive Jetty proposal of Sanghi 
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Committee members also pointed out that in the mere four days available to 
them to visit the site and write a report, a comprehensive appraisal even of the 
particular aspect of the project allotted to them was not possible. For instance, the 
Committee had not deliberated the fact that a port was coming up just 80 kilometres 
from the proposed jetty site. The Company could use this port to transport its product. 
It did not need to build a dedicated jetty and in the process destroy scarce mangroves 
and a unique coastal ecosystem
43. 
Interestingly, even though the Agarwal Committee saw that environmental 
clearances for the cement project  had  been gained in fragments over four-plus years, 
this Committee too was compelled to give its clearance for the part of the project- the 
coastal jetty- that it had been asked to judge. Looking at the project holistically for its 
cumulative environmental impact was not in the mandate of this committee, nor in 
that of any other. It could have been, had any provincial government authority 
demanded this. However, this was not the case. In fact, as demonstrated above, 
provincial government authorities were functioning as brokers, arguing the case for 
environmental clearance on behalf of the Company.  
The illustrations of piece-by-piece liberalisation, governmental brokerage on 
behalf of private companies
44, and the simplification and easing of laws to facilitate 
the entry of private enterprise into Gujarat tell a story of the mechanics of 
liberalisation. This story is informative in itself. It becomes doubly so when one 
highlights the central role of the government system in this process. This sub-section 
has attempted to do just that. 
 
Having looked at the state’s intervention in the Karkhana case through the 
production of legitimating ideas as well as governmental manoeuvring of obstacles 
faced by the Company, the final sub-section turns to the state’s engagement with the 
layers of politics surrounding the issue.  
The Karkhana case and the process of land liberalisation in the 1990s in 
general, were embedded in a varied political milieu. Parts of this milieu were more 
‘formal’ and official than others. Among the former, one would include party politics, 
especially legislative politics. Much of the Karkhana case was not discussed or even 
brought to the notice of the legislature. The government system, including the Chief 
Minister’s Office, the departments of Forest and Industry, and the Kachchh 
Collectorate, buoyed by the grand ideas of liberalisation, made most decisions 
regarding the case through executive order. Yet, some aspects of the project were 
indeed brought to the legislature. Among these was the delimitation of the NSWS to 
provide mining facilities to Karkhana.  
We have seen that owing to litigation and the subsequent decision of the High 
Court
45, the Janata Party-Congress government failed to push the mining component 
of the project through executive decision in 1993. However, the same was made 
possible by a legislative vote over the delimiting of the NSWS, proposed by the BJP 
government. While this formal, democratic process sanctioned an important part of 
                                                 
43 Pande, P. (1997) ‘Letter addressed to the Chair of the Committee appointed by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests to assess the Captive Jetty proposal of Sanghi Industries Limited in Kachchh 
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the Karkhana project, and affirmed the government’s support for it, we know that the 
legislative building of consensus was rather cosmetic. Only the ruling party voted for 
the resolution. All questions from the Congress Opposition about the large amounts of 
money that had allegedly exchanged hands between Karkhana and BJP politicians, the 
project being passed on the BJPs absolute majority and being against the interests of 
Kachchh, were brushed aside when the party got thrown out of the house for rowdy 
behaviour
46.  
The seeking of democratic consensus by the government, and the questioning 
of the Karkhana project by the Opposition were played out along a script of formal, 
procedural democracy. The latter is being suggested because the proposition of the 
project by the ruling party, and the opposition by the Congress party in 1995, stood 
reversed in 1993. At that time, the delimitation of the NSWS had been sanctioned by 
the ruling Congress and vehemently opposed by the BJP
47. The BJP, in fact, had 
accused the Congress government of ‘underhand dealings’ with commercial interests 
in the Karkhana case
48. Despite the scripted and procedural nature of this exercise, it 
had a wider democratic purpose that went beyond party politics. This wider purpose 
can be seen as the formal, ‘consensual’ legitimisation of the liberalisation of land for 
Karkhana.  
The legislative, formal political processes associated with the Karkhana case 
may have been problematic. Yet, it is these processes that were elevated and 
acknowledged as valid by various layers of the state and even by Karkhana. For 
instance, soon after the NSWS was delimited in 1995, Karkhana released an 
advertisement in the local newspapers. The Company indicated that it was ‘thankful’ 
for prompt and prudent action in denotifying the ‘technically existent but practically 
non-existent’ sanctuary in the face of the ‘wild allegations made by a few people 
against the Government’
49.  
Juxtaposed with the layer of ‘legitimate’ and ‘elevated’ politics in the 
Karkhana case, is a layer of politics and opposition, driven by NGOs and people’s 
groups affected by the cement project. This layer of politics was portrayed as 
illegitimate, and was neutralised and shunned by the government and by Karkhana. 
Thus as we have seen already, the proponents of this politics including activists and 
NGOs who questioned the project on environmental grounds, or on the claimed 
growth in trickle down prosperity, were termed anti-national opponents of 
development
50. Such defamation of political opposition was bolstered by the fact that 
while there were objections to the manner in which the Karkhana project was being 
ushered in to Kachchh, or to the liberalisation of land for it, this opposition was 
fragmented, and could be counter-balanced.  
For instance, two of the supporters of the umbrella NGO LAS that filed 
litigation against the NSWS delimitation were the Kachchhi NGOs- Gujarat Jan 
Jagaran Sangh (The Collective to Awaken the People of Gujarat) and Kachchh Lok 
Samiti (Kachchh People’s Society). The former is an organisation of pastoralists that 
works in western Kachchh. Its argument was that with government revenue and forest 
land being allotted to private industry, its use as wild pasture would no longer be 
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possible for the many pastoral groups of Kachchh who had no other means of 
livelihood. This NGO was also concerned about the pollution of water bodies and the 
increasing soil salinity that the entry of cement companies into Kachchh portended. 
This would have been compelling opposition, had it not been counterbalanced by 
other groups that also claimed to speak for the people of Kachchh.  
Affidavits submitted to the High Court of Gujarat indicate that in 1995-96, the 
Industries Development Committee of Western Kachchh and some of the headmen 
from villages around where the Karkhana plant was to be set up, insisted that they 
would welcome industry and development into their villages (Paschim Kachchh 
Udhyogic Vikas Samiti 1996). Thus, in the Karkhana case, opposition from groups 
like LAS and local pastoralists was neutralised by support from village politicians and 
bodies of traders, who had been promised jobs by the Company, and assured of the 
spill-over effects that would accrue when western Kachchh became a hub of the 
cement industry.  
In a complex political milieu of governmental and legislative proposition and 
opposition, the building of democratic consensus and the neutralising and de-
legitimising of extra-governmental opposition, the Karkhana project was pushed 
through. The paragraphs above suggest that the project was made possible and 
legitimate not despite the milieu of politics and ‘stealth’




This paper has sketched the story of the Indian state in the liberalising 
landscape of the 1990s. It has focused on a case of the deregulation and privatisation 
of land for a cement project in Kutch, Gujarat. The Karkhana project is fully 
functional today. Its existence, together with that of other such enterprises underlines 
the fact that liberalisation is a part of India’s politico-economic fabric today. 
However, this study has also highlighted the complexity and contests that are part and 
parcel of the process of liberalisation. 
The Indian state is at the heart of the nuances and contortions associated with 
liberalisation. It is, crucially, also at the core of the processes through which these 
complications are manoeuvred and negotiated. Liberalisation may not be proceeding 
unhindered in India today, but without the facilitation and active intervention of the 
state, one wonders if liberalisation would be able to proceed at all. 
In bringing out the centrality of the state in liberalisation, the paper has 
questioned and gone beyond two dominant paradigms of the place of the state in 
India’s contemporary political economy, viz. withdrawal and regulation. The state has 
been detailed in this paper as (a) the generator of legitimating ideas about the positive 
effects of liberalisation, (b) the institutional supplier of legislative authenticity and 
manoeuvrer of unfavourable bureaucratic regulations and anti-liberalisation contests, 
and (c) the buffer through which both democratic, official and party as well as 
grassroots, NGO and non-party politics is acknowledged, filtered and tackled.  
A multi-faceted state that is central to the process of liberalisation cannot be 
categorised as backtracking from the economic field. Moreover, a state that is going 
out of its way to argue for, represent and support the private actors of the liberalising 
landscape, both legally as well as extra-legally, is difficult to classify as being on the 
facilitative, regulatory sidelines of liberalisation. The Gujarat state’s engagement with 
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the Karkhana cement enterprise must thus be seen as a continuing state 
interventionism in the spheres of economy and development.  
The contemporary interventionism of the Indian state cannot, of course, be 
classified along with the activity of an entity that was involved with economic 
production, distribution and occasionally redistribution in an earlier developmental 
era. Instead, this continued involvement in the spheres of the economy and 
development may be seen as the manoeuvres of a state looking for a role and 
continued relevance in a changing national as well as global politico-economic 
context. The Karkhana case is but one illustration of the on-going reinvention of the 
state in a dynamic milieu. This illustration has modelled the evolving state as a 
legitimator of and negotiator and buffer in the contested and complex liberalising 
landscape.  
 
 
 
 
 
 